

1918—

—1944—  
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Entered as 2nd class matter

Alfred University Reading Room

Alfred

New York

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIV, No. 7

DECEMBER 1, 1944

## WARTIME CONDITIONS GENERATE UNREST IN LATIN AMERICA

AS replies to Argentina's request for a conference of Foreign Ministers come in from the various American governments, it seems probable that an inter-American conference on post-war affairs will be held shortly, but that the Argentine question will be handled, if at all, incidentally to the main business of the assembly. Mr. Stettinius, whose nomination to succeed Mr. Hull as Secretary of State was announced on November 27, declared three days earlier that final decision would devolve on the Governing Board of the Pan American Union.

**LATIN AMERICA IN FERMENT.** If and when the conference is held, it will be without the representation of Argentina and San Salvador, neither of which has been recognized by the majority of the other American governments. By their absence the fact will be stressed that the New World union of states is faced with problems as grave as any it has ever encountered in its fifty years of existence.

For five years participants, directly or indirectly, in the world war, the people of Latin America are again turning their attention to the pressing need for political, economic and social reform at home. Political shifts, upheavals and revolutions in Central America, Ecuador and Bolivia, and further south among the countries within the Argentine orbit, do not seem to fall into the old familiar pattern of one-man seizure of power. Instead, they appear to owe their existence to a combination of novel factors: wartime social and economic dislocations; widening cleavages between Left and Right; a growing awareness of the evils of governments palpably maintained by force; and such ideological challenges of the war years as the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, which have made a serious and lasting impression on the rank and file of Latin America.

For the first time in the history of Latin America, perhaps, the man in the street is taking an active and sustained part in bringing about political reform. The

revolutions of last spring and summer in San Salvador and Guatemala were the result of popular agitations, in the course of which the new weapon of passive resistance was introduced. When the revolution in Guatemala showed evidence of backfiring to the advantage of the former dictator Jorge Ubico through his tool, Provisional President Federico Ponce, the people rose again on October 20, in a not-so-bloodless revolt, to establish a more democratic government and elect a Constituent Assembly. Opposition broke out in San Salvador on the same date. But the uprising which effected a people's victory in Guatemala, in San Salvador only perpetuated the ascendancy of military elements, now headed by Colonel Osmín Aguirre. The people of that small but politically conscious country, however, have not yet been subdued—as evidenced by reports of strikes, rioting and underground resistance. The San Salvadoreans have established the first government-in-exile in this hemisphere, with headquarters in Mexico. Meanwhile, the tottering dictatorships of Honduras and Nicaragua may join with the government of Salvador in throwing a *cordon sanitaire* around Guatemala to prevent spread of revolution by exiles now safe in Guatemala and Mexico.

**THE "ARGENTINE TANAKA MEMORIAL."** Further south, closer union of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador is being sought. The movement for "Greater Colombia" may be interpreted simply as a step toward the realization of Simón Bolívar's old dream of federation. It may be, on the other hand, an attempt to seek mutual protection against possible Argentine expansionist tendencies. It is not impossible that the Foreign Offices of Bogotá and Caracas have seen the document purportedly issued on May 3, 1943 by the Argentine G.O.U. to army officers, stating that "in South America, it is our mission to make the leadership of Argentina not only possible but indisputable. Once we have won power,

it will be necessary to arm ourselves constantly. Hitler's fight in peace and war will guide us."

According to this program of aggression, a bloc of southern states will be forged by means of alliances with Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile, and pressure subsequently exerted on Uruguay and Brazil to combine with them. In Chile and Brazil, this document is not being dismissed as a military pipe-dream. In Chile, the demand for closer economic and political union with Buenos Aires may become a feature of the program of the parties of the Right. Already such leading politicians as ex-President Arturo Alessandri—who has recently been elected Senator, and Galvarino Gallardo, Mayor of Santiago, have expressed themselves in favor of closer relations with Argentina. Meanwhile, from behind the censorship curtaining Brazil, rumors escape to indicate that the question of recognizing the Farrell-Perón government may be dividing the country as it has divided Chile. The reactionary elements now uppermost in the Vargas government that rules Brazil might draw comfort from the support of like-minded elements in the Farrell government. Counterbalancing this

consideration, however, is the traditional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil for leadership on the South American continent. Brazil, which counts as immediate neighbors all the South American countries except Chile, is equally concerned with what happens in Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, and in these countries its interests seem more likely to clash than to coincide with those of Argentina. In addition, United States disapproval of a resumption of diplomatic relations between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires would weigh heavily with Vargas.

Beyond the immediate and obvious problems which an inter-American conference must face—participation in the proposed security organization, development and correlation of post-war economic programs, and the like—there is, then, the need to review hemisphere relationships and to find some basis for continued collaboration. This imponderable cannot be listed on an official agenda; but it will be implicit in all that is said and done at the conference.

OLIVE HOLMES

*(The second in a series of articles on post-war Latin America.)*

## RUSSIAN AID IN LIBERATION AFFECTS NORWAY'S FOREIGN POLICY

With Red Army forces and a small Norwegian vanguard fighting side by side on Norway's Arctic front, the liberation of the first Western European nation to fall to the *Wehrmacht* in 1940 has begun. Although in its initial phases the Battle of Norway has been fought for small towns that seem remote and relatively unimportant to most Norwegians, and has involved naval and air bases the Nazis used in attacking Russia-bound convoys, these actions have succeeded in whittling down strength the Nazis might otherwise have used farther south. The Norwegians are not unduly optimistic about the date of liberation, however, and are aware that the approximately 175,000 German troops now in Norway will continue to use their present scorched-earth policy to impede the Russian drive southwestward. To speed up the fighting and restrict the destructive German rearguard actions, Norwegians feel the Red Army's land campaign will have to be supplemented by Anglo-American naval operations.

**RUSSIA AS A NEW NEIGHBOR.** Russia's participation in Norway's liberation and the establishment of a Russo-Norwegian frontier as a result of Finland's cession of Petsamo to the U.S.S.R., make it necessary for the Norwegian government to clarify its relationships with its new neighbor in the far north. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Trygve Lie arrived in Moscow on November 6 for extended talks with Soviet officials. The first questions discussed were of a practical nature and involved further implementation of the agreement reached by the Norwegian and Russian governments on May 17 for restoration of local government as soon as military

operations permitted.

The Red Army is reported to have been scrupulously correct in carrying out these Russo-Norwegian arrangements. The Russians have also agreed to turn over the administration of the liberated territories behind their lines to Norwegian "police" forces trained in Sweden. These forces consist of young Norwegians who fled to Sweden during the years of German occupation and there volunteered for police duties in their native country following its liberation. During their training in Sweden these men, who number approximately eight or nine thousand, have been schooled both under Swedish Army officers and leaders from their own army who escaped to Sweden, and are now capable of serving as second-line troops. To assure these police forces' entry into Norway before the country is entirely liberated, as required by the original Swedish plan, the Norwegian Foreign Minister stopped in Stockholm en route to the Kremlin. The Swedish government, in line with its current policy of supporting the Allies—and particularly Norway—as openly as its neutrality permits, granted the Norwegian request, and at least a part of the police forces are believed to be already on their way to northern Norway by a secret route.

Russian approval of a food relief program for Norway was also sought by the Norwegian Foreign Minister during his visit to Moscow, and there are indications that it has been secured. The Norwegian government feels that immediate food relief is vital, for present Allied strategy—which requires that German troops in Norway be locked in and prevented from joining in the battle of Germany—has

resulted in stopping all traffic between Norway and the Reich. It is consequently no longer possible for the Germans to bring food and other supplies into Norway, as they have done in former years, and the Nazis are requisitioning increasingly larger amounts of food and equipment locally. To meet this crisis, the Norwegian government proposes that food obtained from Sweden, with the recent Swedish grant of 200,000,000 crowns (\$50,000,000) in credit for relief, be sent to Norway under supervision of the International Red Cross and Sweden.

**WHAT FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY?** In the new Europe that is emerging from the war, in which Germany will no longer be a dominant nation and Russia will exercise strong influence, Norway's position in international affairs—like that of most of the Continental nations—will require considerable re-orientation. In Norwegian opinion, there is little reason for the belief that the Scandinavian community that existed before the war will resume its old form. One reason is that Finland has now been placed under Russian control, and although the Norwegian government merely severed relations with Finland following Britain's declaration of war against that country in 1941, it is eager to avoid any involvement

in Finnish-Russian affairs. As a form of insurance against such involvement, Norway has reached an informal agreement with the Russians, whereby the Red Army will prevent Finnish forces—now about 35 miles from the Norwegian border—from entering Norway in the course of action against the Nazis.

A change may also be expected in Norway's attitude toward Britain. In the past, most of Norway's commercial as well as political ties have been with the West because of its heavy dependence on imports and, therefore, on overseas trade. Nothing would seem more natural, accordingly, than that Norway should join the projected British bloc in Western Europe after the war. Such a step may not, however, be taken by the Norwegians because of both economic and political considerations. In the economic sphere, it may appear necessary for Norway to form commercial ties with many nations besides Britain, and particularly with the United States, in order to obtain the shipbuilding facilities needed to restore its merchant fleet—more than half of which has been destroyed during the war. And in the realm of international politics the Norwegians feel that they cannot afford to join a bloc that might be viewed with distrust by Russia.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

## AFGHANISTAN LEADS THE MIDDLE EAST ON OPIUM

Afghanistan will prohibit all planting of the opium poppy from March 21, 1945. The State Department, on November 20, released the announcement of policy in which Afghanistan declares that, "in the interest of international cooperation and because of humanitarian sentiment," it is ready to take this important step. The opium it exported was used for legitimate drug manufacture for medical and scientific use. Instead of claiming any share in the legitimate export market for medical and scientific needs, Afghanistan is stopping all production of the raw material. Thus, it is willing to eliminate, in one drastic move, a product which amounts to a considerable percentage of its total export trade.

This action proves not only Afghanistan's desire to collaborate internationally but also its freedom of action. This nation enjoys independence in an important strategic area in the Middle East. Its action on opium shows what a country so situated can do when it is not subject to political pressures from great powers, directly or indirectly. By this action, Afghanistan becomes a leader of the Middle East in matters of humanitarian sentiment and international cooperation. Its decision raises sharply the question as to what action Iran and India will take in replying to the resolution—first introduced in Congress by Rep-

resentative Walter Judd of Minnesota—authorizing the President to urge countries producing opium to limit the volume of production strictly to medical and scientific purposes.\* Iran has frequently declared that it could not make any reduction in its poppy acreage without a foreign loan to compensate for the loss of revenue, and technical agricultural assistance to its opium farmers for substitution of crops—in spite of the fact that its international position has been complicated over many years by large seizures of Iranian opium in the illicit traffic. India has always heretofore maintained that the sale of government opium for eating through government-licensed shops fills a "quasi-medical need" and, as an internal question, is not subject to treaty limitation.

Experience has proved to governments that addiction among their own nationals does occur in those areas where the opium poppy is produced. Afghanistan will no longer permit this danger, which might eventually debase its own sturdy peasants. Seldom before in the international history of opium control has a country given more heartening proof that it is facing the future with wisdom and vision.

HELEN HOWELL MOORHEAD


\*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, July 21, 1944.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIV, No. 7, DECEMBER 1, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEBT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year  
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.



# Washington News Letter



## WILL INTERNATIONALIST MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WIN LEADERSHIP?

The manner in which Congress responds during the coming two years to foreign policy proposals from the White House will depend in some measure on the willingness of newly elected, internationally minded members of the Senate and House to take positions of leadership in debate while they are yet fledglings. Few of the new members are likely to be selected by their colleagues for key positions of direct influence on foreign policy inside Congress—such as membership in the Senate Foreign Relations or the House Foreign Affairs committees. The two houses of Congress customarily honor seniority in major committee selections, and the committees possess the great power of ignoring any matter referred to them. Only extraordinary pressure from other members and the public can move committees against their will.

**STRENGTH OF NEW CONGRESSMEN.** Yet the group of new members may exercise unusual indirect influence on Congressional attitudes toward policy. Their election apparently reflected a strong desire on the part of the voters for United States participation in an international organization, and this trend in popular sentiment can fortify the large number of veteran Senators and Congressmen who share the views of those who will become their colleagues with the opening of the Seventy-Ninth Congress on January 3.

This gathering of strength has greater importance in the Senate than in the House, where the Administration's following is more regular. The outstanding Senators-elect with internationalist sympathies are J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, who played a leading role during his first term in the House; Brian McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut; John Moses, Democrat of North Dakota; Francis J. Myers, Democrat of Pennsylvania; Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts; H. Alexander Smith, Republican of New Jersey; and Bourke Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa.

Some of these newcomers to the Senate enjoy wider national reputations than many already there. Fulbright's name is attached to the first resolution passed by Congress in support of United States membership in an international organization. Saltonstall became well known as Governor of Massachusetts, and Hickenlooper as Governor of Iowa. McMahon, a former Assistant Attorney General of the United

States, is familiar to Washington. Moses, a lawyer, while not nationally known, symbolizes with special clarity the trend away from isolationism. Not only did he defeat Senator Gerald P. Nye, but he won in spite of the fact that during much of the election campaign he was confined to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.

**NEW FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE.** While the Democratic and Republican Steering Committees are expected to choose none of these new men for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the Seventy-Ninth Congress, the Democrats at least are disposed to select members who support international collaboration. The 1944 primaries and election retired from the Senate five of the Committee's twenty-three members—two isolationist Democrats, Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina and Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri; one lukewarm, internationalist Democrat, Guy Gillette of Iowa; and two isolationist Republicans, Nye and James J. Davis of Pennsylvania. The leading candidates for two of the Democratic vacancies are Carl Hatch of New Mexico and Scott Lucas of Illinois, both internationalist supporters of the Administration.

Yet, at the same time that voters in some states were electing energetic friends of an international organization, others re-elected a number of isolationists, notably Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin and Charles Tobey of New Hampshire; and sent to the Senate for the first time some men whose policies are not yet clear, among them Homer Capehart, Republican of Indiana, a successful businessman in several fields. A number of Senators previously considered isolationists will sit in the Seventy-Ninth Congress as hold-overs. Some of them—Hiram Johnson, Arthur Capper, Robert M. LaFollette, Wallace H. White, Jr., and Henrik Shipstead—are members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Time will show whether these men, known as isolationists, will change the views they have sincerely held because many voters seemed to favor international collaboration. Meanwhile, new Senators like Fulbright and Saltonstall will battle for their cause beside Senator Joseph M. Ball, Republican of Minnesota, one of the most outspoken Senatorial internationalists who, nevertheless, is not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

BLAIR BOLLES

**FOR VICTORY • BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS**